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Introduction
What do you do? As a lawyer (or prospective lawyer), I mean—what do you do (or what will you do) in exchange for a salary or hourly 
fee? You will probably be expecting a lot of money for your services; so what, 
exactly, is it that you will do to justify that payment?
The answer, of course, is varied because lawyers do lots of different things. 
And, among these activities, there are some things that only lawyers can do. 
Chief among those is suing people. Suing people is something that only 
lawyers do because states do not generally permit non–lawyers to appear 
in court or file pleadings.2 Accordingly, doing so—whether in pursuit of 
injunctive relief, declaratory relief, or a monetary remedy—is a significant 
part of the current legal market.3 Indeed, it is the professional focus of the 
many lawyers who practice commercial litigation or who perform collections 
work. In these areas of the law, lawyers sue people in an attempt to validate 
their clients’ rights and causes of actions with a money judgment.
So what you do very likely comes down to getting money. This is not 
novel, of course: many people spend their time arguing about, dealing with, 
or negotiating over money. What is somewhat unique, however, is just how 
clean and abrupt a lawyer’s role is in this context: your job is (or will be) 
to take property belonging to someone else and convert it into property 
belonging to your client—in other words, to create a property interest for 
your client.
Creditors have a unique ability in our legal system to acquire property 
rights in assets belonging to debtors. This Article examines these “creditor 
property rights,” in general, and those granted to creditors of debtors that 
1 Assistant Professor of Law, St. Mary’s University School of Law. J.D., Brigham Young 
University; B.A., Brigham Young University.
2 This prohibition does not, of course, apply to permitted pro se claimants.
3 Compare Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2012–13 Edition: What Lawyers Do, Bureau Lab. 
Stat. http://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/lawyers.htm#tab–2 (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (stating that law-
yers’ responsibilities include conducting legal research, preparing legal documents, and representing 
parties at trial), with Occupational Outlook Handbook, 2012–13 Edition: What Paralegals and Legal 
Assistants Do, Bureau Lab. Stat. http://www.bls.gov/ooh/legal/paralegals–and–legal–assistants.
htm#tab–2 (last visited Feb. 8, 2014) (describing paralegals’ and legal assistants’ responsibilities, 
including fact investigation, drafting legal documents, and assisting lawyers at trial).
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own interests in partnerships, limited partnerships, and limited liability 
companies, in particular.4 More specifically, this Article examines charging 
orders—the redress granted to a creditor vis–à–vis a debtor’s interest in a 
partnership entity—and argues that this remedy is a much more significant, 
useful, and choate right than is generally acknowledged by either the 
academy or the bar.
Part I begins this examination by looking at the history of creditor 
property rights and the manner in which they have developed over the 
years, culminating in our current system, which allows creditors to “convert” 
debtor property to creditor property via execution. This redress represents 
the ultimate creditor right, but it does not stand alone. Rather, the courts 
have fashioned a number of remedies that grant creditors a “partial” property 
right. Of chief interest here is the charging order, which is reviewed in 
detail in Part II. This Part explains the function, history, and evolution 
of this remedy from its inception. The charging order initially developed 
in the partnership context, in response to a perceived unfairness existing 
when a creditor gained unfettered rights in the partnership interest of a 
debtor–partner and the partnership’s underlying assets. Based on this 
inequity, the courts granted creditors a provisional right in partnership 
property (a “quasi” property right) by permitting the creditor to intercept 
certain distributions that would otherwise flow from the partnership to 
the partner but prohibiting any interference with the partnership itself. 
The remedy quickly spread to limited partnerships and was incorporated 
into LLC law from its inception. This is particularly important given the 
explosive popularity of the LLC over the last thirty–five years5 and the 
fact that the charging order—and its attendant limitation on creditors 
(whether real or perceived)—has had an enormous effect on planning, on 
transactional work, and on litigation in general.
Part III expands upon Part II’s examination of the charging order 
remedy and argues that creditors of partnership entity owners are not as 
limited as is widely believed and that the perception of the charging order 
as an effective barrier to collection is exaggerated. Part III focuses on the 
underlying purpose of creditor property rights and charging orders and 
analyzes the language of some of the statutes that create the charging order 
remedy. By placing charging orders in their proper context (as a type of 
4 Hereafter, limited liability companies are referred to as LLCs, and all three of these entities 
are collectively referred to as “partnership entities.”
5 See, e.g., John R. Price & Samuel A. Donaldson, Price on Contemporary Estate 
Planning § 11.1, at 11–5 (2011 ed. 2010) (“[T]he LLC has become the vehicle of choice.”); David 
L. Cohen, Theories of the Corporation and the Limited Liability Company: How Should Courts and 
Legislatures Articulate Rules for Piercing the Veil, Fiduciary Responsibility and Securities Regulation for 
the Limited Liability Company?, 51 Okla. L. Rev. 427, 447 & n.108 (1998) (“The LLC has spread like 
wildfire throughout the country.”); Howard M. Friedman, The Silent LLC Revolution—The Social 
Cost of Academic Neglect, 38 Creighton L. Rev. 35, 35 (2004) (“The [LLC] has become the domi-
nant form for newly–created small businesses in a clear majority of the states . . . .”).
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creditor property interest) and by focusing on actual statutory language, 
this Part highlights the options available to holders charging orders. These 
options are substantial and should be more aggressively utilized by courts 
and lawyers. If that occurs, the charging order will assume a more rightful 
place in the hierarchy of creditor rights and afford much greater creditor 
protection than it presently does. 
The Article concludes, then, that most lawyers’ belief that a charging 
order effectively precludes creditor recovery is significantly overstated and 
that, given the extraordinary prevalence of partnership entities today, this 
is an important point that lawyers, teachers, and students overlook at their 
own peril.
I. Creditor Property Rights
As indicated above, creditor property rights constitute a large part of our 
legal system. They do so substantively, in that property is a significant part of the 
legal world and property rights arising from creditors’ claims are a significant 
subset of property. And they do so practically, in that much of our legal system 
and the current practice of law focus on creditor rights and on creditors’ 
attempts to gain rights to debtor property. The award of a charging order as 
a remedy constitutes a small, but significant, element of this story. As such, in 
order to fully analyze charging orders, it is necessary to first focus more broadly 
on creditor property rights generally. Looking at the history and evolution 
of this area of the law—with a particular focus on execution, the ultimate 
remedy available to a creditor seeking to lay claim to debtor property—lays the 
foundation for understanding charging orders and the relief creditors should 
achieve thereunder.
A. Historical Development of Creditor Property Rights
Modern creditor rights vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, but the 
early history and nature of credit arose in the same way throughout human 
societies.6 Early on, when trade was primarily an individual matter without 
a strong underlying sense of custom or propriety, there was no real concern 
about creating creditor property rights (or about doing anything else to 
protect creditors) because there simply was no credit.7 There was no real 
trust among people, and there was no large commercial class, so payment 
was contemporaneous with the delivery of goods or services and no one 
worried about how to collect on their debts.8
6 See generally Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, 66 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 223, 228–31 (1918) (examining how societies developed their understanding of credit).
7 Id. at 228.
8 Id.; see also Louis Edward Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, 67 U. Pa. L. 
Rev. 1, 3 (1919) (quoting Sir Frederick Pollock, English Law Before the Norman Conquest, in 1 Select 
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At some point, however, this changed. Due to the increasingly complex 
nature of society, and to the commercialization and specialization of trade, 
suspension of payment was gradually introduced.9 At first, the willingness 
of one party to a transaction to permit the other party to borrow (that is, 
to extend credit to a borrower) was viewed as an exception, to be extended 
only rarely or only to a privileged few.10 Soon, however, economic necessity 
intruded, and credit became a commonplace element of commercial 
exchange.11 However, creditors did not fear default because of sanctions 
that developed and built up alongside the creation and normalization of 
commercial debt.12
The first such sanction was generally religious in nature and was meant to 
bring public approbation and spiritual pressure to bear.13 One illustration is 
the method of “sitting d’harna,” traditionally utilized in India.14 Thereunder, 
a creditor who was owed money simply sat on the debtor’s doorway, for 
all of the debtor’s family and neighbors to see, until the debt was paid.15
Another example comes from Egypt. There, a debtor traditionally “pledged” 
the mummified body of a near, deceased relative, especially one’s father.16
If the debtor defaulted, the creditor removed the mummy and closed the 
family tomb against the debtor’s own burial.17 The second sanction related to 
execution, though not the sort we traditionally think of. Here, non–paying 
debtors were subject to severe, physical mistreatment, often culminating in 
explicit violence.18 Under Hindu law, for example, a creditor could maim or 
kill a debtor, enslave the debtor, or harm the debtor’s family.19 Under the 
Code of Hammurabi, the debtor or the debtor’s family were regularly sold 
into slavery,20 and, in Rome, the debtor was said to have pledged his own 
body against repayment, with failure to honor the debt often resulting in 
the execution of the person.21
Essays in Anglo–American Legal History 88, 104 (Ass’n of Am. Law Sch. ed., 1907)) (“Prior 
to the Norman Conquest, ‘business had hardly got beyond ready money between parties both pres-
ent,’ and there was not much room for trade confidences.”).
9 See Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, supra note 6, at 229.
10 See id.
11 See id.
12 See id.
13 See id.
14 Id.
15 Id.
16 Id.
17 Id.
18 Id. at 229–30.
19 Id. at 230.
20 Id.
21 Id. at 231.
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Credit in its early forms, then, was either non–existent or strenuously 
enforced. It was not until later, as custom mellowed and formal law supplanted 
tradition, that creditor protection solidified into a regulated whole. In the 
English and American system, contingent creditor property rights were 
created in debtor property. This was accomplished by turning execution 
away from the person and toward their property, thereby protecting debtors’ 
freedom and physical safety but not their estate.22 Debtor protection was 
not the sole basis for this change, however. Instead, this was “an instance of 
the general evolution of legal process from the stage were [sic] retaliation is 
the end in view to the stage where compensation is the chief desideratum.”23
So execution against property came to be the ultimate creditor remedy 
in our system of laws—the option to which a creditor can turn when faced 
with a non–paying debtor and when in need of recompense. This right to 
reach out and convert another’s property to one’s own property is powerful 
in its own right and is particularly interesting as it relates to charging 
orders, a lesser (but related) remedy. Because of this relevance, it is worth 
examining execution at greater length.
B. Execution, the Ultimate Creditor Remedy
The transition from personal execution to property–based (or proprietary) 
execution was a relatively natural one, given the competing concerns regarding 
the debtor’s safety and the creditor’s need for compensation and the historical 
basis of execution existing in most systems of jurisprudence.24 These systems, 
as indicated above, often viewed the debtor’s body as a direct pledge on the 
debt.25 From there, it was a relatively natural transition to viewing the debtor’s 
property as also serving as security.26 This leap, from person to property, created 
22 It is important, here, to distinguish the remedy of execution from that of foreclosure. Fore-
closure is similar to execution in that it permits creditors to convert debtor property to their own 
and in that it is a result of “the power struggle between borrowers and lenders.” Basil H. Mattingly, 
The Shift from Power to Process: A Functional Approach to Foreclosure Law, 80 Marq. L. Rev., Fall 
1996, at 77, 89 (citing 4 American Law of Property: A Treatise on the Law of Property in 
the United States 427–579 (A. James Casner ed., 1952)). The two are dissimilar, however, in that 
foreclosure is the result of an express contractual agreement between the parties that a particular 
piece of property (or multiple pieces of defined property) should be subject to the creditor’s poten-
tial property rights, whereas execution is the result of a statutorily granted right to generally seize 
property that arises without the debtor’s consent or cooperation. This lack of debtor cooperation 
parallels the granting of a charging order and draws the two together such that charging orders 
can only be truly understood as part of the same spectrum of rights to which execution belongs.
23 Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, supra note 6, at 232.
24 See id. at 232–33.
25 See id. This view may well have arisen from a more explicit pledge of flesh in the context 
of secured transactions. See, e.g., George Lee Flint, Jr., Secured Transactions History: The Fraudulent 
Myth, 29 N.M. L. Rev. 363, 365 (1999) (“Primitive Roman law required human hostages providing 
slave labor to the secured party.”).
26 See Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, supra note 6, at 232.
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a new set of creditor rights, ranging from the right of an individual creditor to 
execute against specific property (individual proprietary execution) to the right 
of one or more creditors to seize the entire debtor’s estate and liquidate it for 
the benefit of all creditors (general proprietary execution).27
Tracing these twin developments, individual proprietary execution goes 
back at least as far as the Statute of Acton–Brunell, passed in 1283.28 In response 
to merchant complaints regarding commercial losses, and a concomitant 
refusal to come to England to trade, Edward I passed this law, intending to 
create a speedy method for debt recovery.29 Thereunder, merchants in certain 
cities gained the power to summon debtors before the Mayor and establish 
the debt and default.30 Once done, if the debts were not then paid, the Mayor 
had the right to order the debtor’s assets sold for the benefit of the creditor.31
This process has evolved significantly over the last 720 years, of course, but the 
underlying premise remains. Creditors still have the right to summon debtors32
and to seize their assets to pay proven debts.33
General proprietary execution merely broadened and extended that right. 
The general right of execution developed alongside individual proprietary 
execution as a complementary element of the same basic scheme intended to 
compensate creditors. Here, rather than permitting a single creditor to seize a 
single item of property, the law provided that all of the debtor’s assets (or its 
“estate”) should be seized, sold, and divided up amongst all creditors.34 This 
protects creditors from debtor fraud35 and from each other36 and ultimately 
27 See id. at 232–35.
28 See Levinthal, The Early History of English Bankruptcy, supra note 8, at 7.
29 Id. at 7–8.
30 Id. at 8.
31 Id.
32 Rather than prove the debt before the Mayor, creditors now prove the debt before a court. 
Doing so results in a judgment against the debtor, in favor of the creditor.
33 See, e.g., Cal. Civ. Proc. Code §§ 699.010–.090 (West 2009 & Supp. 2013); Conn. Gen. 
Stat. Ann. §§ 52–367a to –367b (West 2005); Del. Code Ann. tit. 10, §§ 4901–4987 (West 1999 
& Supp. 2012); N.Y. C.P.L.R. 5230 (McKinney 2009); Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. §§ 
34.001–.076 (West 2008 & Supp. 2013).
34 See Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, supra note 6, at 235–37.
35 This occurs, where, for example, a debtor wrongfully favors one creditor over another. See, 
e.g., W.T. Jones, The Foundations of English Bankruptcy: Statutes and Commissions in the Early Modern 
Period, 69 Transactions of the American Philosophical Society, No. 3, New Series, 1, 30 
& n.108 (1979) (discussing P.R.O., C.39/24, Muschamp v. Stoakes (1598), an early case wherein the 
executrix of a debtor confessed judgment in favor of a select number of creditors, thereby entirely 
frustrating all other creditors).
36 This occurs where, for example, the creditors have to “race to the courthouse” to establish 
their rights. See, e.g., Harold S. Burman, Harmonization of International Bankruptcy Law: A United 
States Perspective, 64 Fordham L. Rev. 2543, 2548 (1996) (citing Joint Project of UNCITRAL and 
INSOL International on Cross–Border Insolvencies: Expert Committee’s Report on Cross–Bor-
der Insolvency Access and Recognition, 5 INSOL Int’l Insolvency Rev. 140, 143–44 (1996)) 
(“Unsecured creditors seek to maximize return by preventing exclusion of secured interests, and by 
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served as the basis for modern bankruptcy law, which is essentially a full–scale 
execution of all of a debtor’s (non–exempt) assets.37
What our system has ultimately settled on, then, is a spectrum of creditor 
rights, transferring debtor property to creditors to varying degrees depending on 
a host of factors and circumstances. The charging order is part of this spectrum. 
Though not as powerful as individual proprietary execution (and certainly not 
as broad as general proprietary execution), the charging order is part of a long 
tradition that transfers real and actual rights in debtor property directly to 
creditors. Its rightful place in the panoply of creditor property rights38 speaks 
volumes and is relevant in analyzing the true depth and worth of this remedy. 
Before considering that at length, however, it is useful to examine in detail the 
nature and development of the charging order.
II. Property Form and the Numerus Clausus
So creditor property rights have developed over time, attempting to grant 
creditors property rights as necessary to effect legitimate claims but also 
balancing this creation (or conversion) of property with the legitimate concerns 
and needs of the debtor.39 The charging order is part of this development,40 and 
beating other unsecured creditors in the race to the court house, before a stay may be imposed.”).
37 See Levinthal, The Early History of Bankruptcy Law, supra note 6, at 225–27.
38 This spectrum should be seen as a whole series of rights and interests developed by the 
law in order to compensate creditors with debtor property but to do so in a reasonable fashion that 
balances the competing concerns of the opposing parties. Another right that exists along this spec-
trum, for example, is the claim of fraudulent transfer, originating in the Statute of 13 Elizabeth and 
invalidating “covinous and fraudulent” transfers meant “to delay, hinder or defraud creditors and 
others.” Fraudulent Conveyances Act, 1571, 13 Eliz., c. 5 (1570) (U.K.). Again, this permits creditors 
to exercise control over a debtor’s property in order to ensure creditor payment.
39 And, as discussed below, the interests of third parties doing business with the debtor. See
infra text accompanying notes 51–63.
40 This development has lately culminated in a charging order that applies to debtor interests 
in LLCs. See Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 504 (1996), 6B U.L.A. 605 (2008). This section of the Uni-
form Limited Liability Company Act (ULLCA) addresses the creation and awarding of a charging 
order. Id. ULLCA is a uniform act, adopted by the National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Laws in 1996. See, e.g., J. William Callison, Charging Order Exclusivity: A Pragmatic 
Approach to Olmstead v. Federal Trade Commission, 66 Bus. Law. 339, 345 (2011). The Revised Uni-
form Limited Liability Company Act (RULLCA) followed in 2006. Id.; Rev. Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. 
Act (2006), 6B U.L.A. 407 (2008). Though neither statute has been systematically adopted by the 
various states, they both serve as reasonable and useful guidance as to how state LLC statutes gen-
erally function and so are referred to throughout this Article. See Callison, supra, at 345–46. Though 
LLCs, general partnerships, and limited partnerships are all distinct types of business entities with 
distinct rules, LLC charging orders have evolved directly from the general partnership and limited 
partnership charging order concepts and all charging orders function in roughly the same manner. 
See id. at 341–45. Accordingly, this Article frequently cites to the Uniform Partnership Act (UPA), 
the Revised Uniform Partnership Act (RUPA), the Uniform Limited Partnership Act (ULPA), 
and the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act (RULPA), and all of these acts may be relied 
on herein to the extent relevant.
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the nature of the charging order is relevant because of what it tells us about 
the placement and purpose of charging orders within the general penumbra 
of creditor property rights, how that function has changed over time, and how 
charging orders ought to be perceived and utilized by the bar and judiciary.
A. Description and Initial History
The charging order constitutes a distinctive part of the general suite of 
creditor property rights. It arises only in the context of partnership entities 
and effectively prevents creditors from directly seizing debtor interests in these 
businesses.41 Instead of direct execution, a judgment creditor may use a charging 
order to “reach only the debtor–member’s interest in the firm’s distributions, 
somewhat like garnishment.”42 This means that the creditor is able to gain a 
property interest in something (the right to distributions) but not the actual 
interest in the entity itself.43 The charging order, then, constitutes a lien on the 
debtor’s right to distributions,44 and it stays attached thereto until the judgment 
is satisfied,45 but it does not affect any other rights the partner had before the 
execution of the order (including managerial rights).46 If the judgment will not 
be satisfied, or if the creditor can demonstrate a need, the relevant court may 
ultimately appoint a receiver, order foreclosure, or make other orders, but these 
remedies are rarely utilized.47
 In this fashion, the law has effectively fashioned an “in between” 
remedy—greater than a naked, unsecured claim but less than the right to 
foreclose or otherwise seize an asset.48 Indeed, “[c]harging orders have been 
41 See infra Part II.B.
42 Larry E. Ribstein, Reverse Limited Liability and the Design of Business Associations, 30 Del. 
J. Corp. L. 199, 203 (2005); see also Carter G. Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Member Limited Liability 
Company Olmstead Charging Order Statutory Lacuna, 16 Stan. J.L. Bus. & Fin. 222, 225 (2011) (refer-
ring to a charging order as “a perpetual garnishment order”).
43 This “bundle of rights” then, is considerably less than what one would have if one owned 
the interest in the entity outright. The actual logistics of getting this lesser bundle of rights probably 
varies from jurisdiction to jurisdiction. In general, the judgment creditor probably needs to obtain 
and serve an order to show cause or some other sort of order from the court directing the partners 
to either oppose the charging order or to consent to its direction that future profits be directed to 
the creditor. See J. Gordon Gose, The Charging Order Under the Uniform Partnership Act, 28 Wash. 
L. Rev. 1, 19 (1953). 
44 Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 504(b), 6B U.L.A. 605.
45 See Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging 
Order Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 225.
46 See, e.g., Weddell v. H2O, Inc., 271 P.3d 743, 750 (Nev. 2012) (“[T]he debtor member no 
longer has the right to future LLC distributions to the extent of the charging order, but retains all 
other rights . . . including managerial interests.”).
47 But see infra Part III.B. These additional rights are at the heart of what this Article is about 
and are discussed at length below.
48 See, e.g., First Mid–Illinois Bank & Trust, N.A. v. Parker, 933 N.E.2d 1215, 1222 (Ill. App. 
Ct. 2010) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“[The Illinois LLC Act Statute regarding charging 
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described as ‘nothing more than a legislative means of providing a creditor 
some means of getting at a debtor’s ill–defined interest in a statutory bastard, 
surnamed ‘partnership,’ but corporately protecting participants by limiting their 
liability as [ ] corporate shareholders.’”49 The charging order, then, is distinctive 
and is not a full property right, but it still fits comfortably within the larger 
galaxy of creditor property rights intended to aid creditors in their quest for 
compensation. Just how this kind of remedy came about is both interesting 
and relevant to this Article’s discussion regarding the legitimate scope and 
application of the LLC charging order. 
As with so many things, the charging order came from England, having 
been incorporated into the English Partnership Act.50 The reason for this 
half–step toward creditor ownership arises from the law’s struggle to define 
and properly treat a partnership vis–à–vis its constituent partners. By its 
very nature, a partnership requires more than one person.51 So who owns 
what? Does each partner own a pro rata share of all property “belonging 
to the partnership”? Or does each partner merely own its particular share 
of the partnership, which in turn directly owns the property titled to the 
entity? This question reflects a long–standing divergence in the treatment 
of partnerships wherein a partnership is treated as either an entity or an 
aggregate of the partners.52
Early law, as embodied in the Uniform Partnership Act of 191453 (UPA), 
adopted the aggregate view, rejecting the idea that the partnership was a 
separate legal entity and dictating that partnership assets were therefore 
owned by the partners collectively.54 This led to significant confusion, 
wherein courts and lawyers mistakenly believed that a partner’s interest was 
a direct interest in the property of the firm, rather than an intangible share 
orders] creates a special remedy that enables the creditor to realize the value of the judgment debt-
or’s distributional interest, while at the same time protecting both the limited liability company’s 
ability to continue to operate and the interests of the other members.”).
49 Weddell, 271 P.3d at 750 (quoting Bank of Bethesda v. Koch, 408 A.2d 767, 770 (Md. Ct. 
Spec. App. 1979)).
50 Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging Order 
Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 231; Gose, supra note 43, at 3; see also Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 301 
cmt. 2 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 101–02 (2001).
51 This is the case in the vast majority of situations. There is, however, an exception to virtu-
ally everything, and, technically, there may be a situation where a partnership continues on with 
a single owner. See generally Robert W. Hillman & Donald J. Weidner, Partners Without Partners: 
The Legal Status of Single Person Partnerships, 17 Fordham J. Corp. & Fin. L. 449 (2012). This minor 
anomaly is not directly relevant here. For our purposes (and in the vast majority of situations), “[a] 
partnership is formed whenever two or more persons voluntarily associate in the carrying on of a 
business without forming some other business organization.” Id. at 471 (emphasis added). 
52 See, e.g., Robert W. Hamilton et al., Cases and Materials on Corporations In-
cluding Partnerships and Limited Liability Companies 46–49 (11th ed. 2010).
53 Unif. P’ship Act (1914), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 275 (2001).
54 See, e.g., Hamilton et al., supra note 52, at 103 (discussing the “tenancy in partnership” 
form of ownership effectively established by the UPA).
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in the business operations of the entity.55 Moreover, even when this concept 
was properly understood, there simply was no procedure by which a creditor 
could seize the debtor–partner’s intangible interest in the business.56 The 
only available remedy was the writ of f ieri facias, which only addressed 
the seizure of physical property.57 As such, “[s]ince it was practically 
inconceivable that valuable partnership interests should be exempt from 
creditors’ claims,” creditors were systematically permitted to seize assets 
directly owned by the partnership.58
This meant that a debtor’s partners had a very direct, and very practical, 
stake in the debtor’s affairs. Effectively, foreclosure of a partner’s interest 
was a foreclosure of the partnership’s assets, and such a foreclosure often 
resulted in a termination of the partnership’s business.59 An early English 
case makes the point well:
When a creditor obtained a judgment against one partner and he wanted 
to obtain the benefit of that judgment against the share of that partner 
in the firm, the first thing was to issue a [writ of execution], and the 
sheriff went down to the partnership place of business, seized everything, 
stopped the business, drove the solvent partners wild, and caused the 
execution creditor to bring an action in Chancery in order to get an 
injunction to take an account and pay over that which was due by the 
execution debtor. A more clumsy method of proceeding could hardly 
have grown up.60
This result was not optimal for anyone. It was unfair to the non–debtor 
partners, for obvious reasons.61 It was a loss to society, insofar as profitable 
and contributing companies were put out of business due to non–market 
externalities.62 And it was often harmful even to the “recovering” creditor 
55 Gose, supra note 43, at 2.
56 Id.
57 See id.
58 See id. (citing Nixon & Chatfield v. Nash, 12 Ohio St. 647, 648 (1861)).
59 See Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging 
Order Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 231.
60 Id. (quoting Brown, Janson & Co. v. A. Hutchinson & Co., [1895] 1 Q.B. 737 (Eng. C.A.)); 
see also Gose, supra note 43, at 1 (“Substantially the same procedure prevailed throughout the United 
States.”). 
61 See Gose, supra note 43, at 2 (listing reasons as disruption of the business and dissolution 
of the partnership).
62 See, e.g., Kenneth S. Klein, When Enough Is Not Enough: Correcting Market Inefficiencies in 
the Purchase and Sale of Residential Property Insurance, 18 Va. J. Soc. Pol’y & L. 345, 346 n.2 (2011) 
(“Inefficient markets are ones unnecessarily burdened with external costs or risks, such as a cost or 
risk that could be eliminated with a solution costing less than the cost or risk itself, or a transac-
tional cost or risk allocated to a party inadequately apprised of the allocation and thus without a 
reasonable opportunity to account for the cost or risk when negotiating the transaction price.”); 
cf. Richard A. Posner, Economic Analysis of Law 533 (8th ed. 2011) (discussing the negative 
economic consequences associated with the impermanence of partnerships).
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because any cessation of business reduced the value of the partnership 
interest the creditor had hoped to retrieve.63
In the United States, numerous reforms were instituted in an attempt to 
address these difficulties. Texas, for example, passed a statute that permitted 
a “symbolic seizure” of a partner’s business interest by physically exhibiting 
the writ at the partnership place of business.64 In other jurisdictions, statutes 
permitted the constructive seizure of partnership assets but forbade any 
actual interference.65 But these new laws did not address the core problem—
distinguishing between a partner’s ownership in the business entity itself 
and that entity’s ownership of property. This state of affairs gave rise to the 
charging order.
The charging order was meant to directly address this problem, which 
arose from the aggregate nature of the partnership, and to “protect the 
partnership business from disruption at the hands of the creditors of an 
individual partner.”66 As discussed above, it did so by permitting creditors 
to theoretically salvage the worth of a partnership interest (i.e., the profit 
arising therefrom) without directly seizing any assets.67 This intermediate 
right seemed a reasonable attempt to balance competing interests by 
providing aid to creditors and simultaneously preventing the harm 
traditionally suffered by innocent third party partners. 
Additionally, the charging order served a number of salutary purposes, 
despite the difficulties arising from an aggregate view of partnerships.68 This 
is because of the relatively small scale of most unincorporated entities and 
what that implies for the owners thereof. Many, if not most, partnerships are 
relatively small and do not involve significant professional management.69
Contrast this with some larger corporations wherein a large number of 
owners—who do not necessarily know anything about each other—come 
63 Gose, supra note 43, at 2 (“[G]ood will and going concern value might be impaired or 
destroyed.”).
64 Id.
65 In Washington, for example, state law allowed the partnership to retain possession if the 
non–debtor partners posted a bond. See id. at 3.
66 Daniel S. Kleinberger, Carter G. Bishop & Thomas Earl Geu, Charging Orders and the 
New Uniform Limited Partnership Act: Dispelling Rumors of Disaster, Prob. & Prop., July–Aug. 2004, 
at 30, 31; see also Gose, supra note 43, at 1.
67 See supra note 43 and accompanying text.
68 RUPA has adopted the entity view of partnerships but has nevertheless retained the 
charging order as a remedy available to creditors of individual partners. See Hamilton et al.,
supra note 52, at 48; see also Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 201 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 91 (2001). Similarly, 
LLC law and limited partnership law both provide for charging orders, even though both sets of 
doctrine clearly honor and accept the entity view. See Rev. Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 503 (2006), 
6B U.L.A. 498–99 (2008); Rev. Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 703 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 463 (2008). 
69 See Lloyd Hitoshi Mayer, Nonprofits, Politics, and Privacy, 62 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 801, 
828 (2012). 
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together as investors in an entity run by highly compensated professionals.70
This generally means that the few owners in a given unincorporated entity 
know each other and consciously choose to do business together. Permitting 
a stranger to intrude into the partnership, then, would work a hardship on 
all parties.71
The law recognizes this hardship and so has established the “pick your 
partner principle,” which essentially dictates that no new partners can 
be admitted into a partnership without the unanimous approval of all 
other partners.72 The charging order effectively backstops this rule against 
assignment,73 ensuring that involuntary assignees play by the same rules 
70 See Kelli A. Alces, Strengthening Investment in Public Corporations Through the Uncorpora-
tion, 35 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1009, 1027 (2012) (“[T]he numerous, widely dispersed shareholders who 
also invest in public corporations.”). But see infra note 76.
71 This is particularly so in a general partnership setting, wherein all partners have equal 
management rights, all partners have apparent authority, all partners have personal liability, and any 
partner can cause dissolution. See Steven O. Weise, PEB Commentary No. ____ Application of UCC 
Sections 9–406 and 9–408 to Transfers of Interests in Unincorporated Business Organizations, ST044 
A.L.I.–ABA 377, 380 (2012). Of course, this desire to be able to determine one’s own partners also 
arises from simple human nature: people enter into business arrangements with specific individuals 
based on trust and a belief that those individuals will make “good” partners. Permitting a debtor–
partner’s creditor to unilaterally interject forces a stranger into the mix, something people gener-
ally, and understandably, do not want. See J. Dennis Hynes, The Charging Order: Conflicts Between 
Partners and Creditors, 25 Pac. L.J. 1, 12 (1993) (“The nondebtor partners in a charging order setting 
have had a situation thrust upon them which occurred outside of the course of partnership business 
and over which they had no control.”). Closely related to this generic desire, however, is a specific 
concern about liability. See generally Hamilton et al., supra note 52, at 104–09. Partners have the 
ability to bind the partnership. Unif. P’ship Act § 9 (1914), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 553 (2001); Rev. Unif. 
P’ship Act § 301 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 101 (2001). And partners are, in turn, liable for partnership 
liabilities. See also Unif. P’ship Act § 15, 6 pt. I U.L.A. 613 (2001); Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 306, 
6 pt. I U.L.A. 117 (2001). Accordingly, every partner is potentially liable for the acts of every other 
partner, and the law generally holds that this potentially unlimited liability should only be incurred 
voluntarily.
72 This “pick your partner” principle is considered “a fundamental characteristic of the law 
and practice related to unincorporated business organizations . . . by which an owner can decide 
who the owner’s business partner or partners may be through the use of those very transfer restric-
tions.” Weise, supra note 71, at 380. This principle is notably expressed in UPA sections 18, 27 and 
RUPA section 401. See Callison, supra note 40, at 343 (“By preventing assignees (both voluntary and 
involuntary) from participating in partnership business, the pick–your–partner principle avoids 
undue and unbargained–for risk to the partnership business and the other partners posed by the ad-
mission of a stranger to the partnership.”). This principle is also at the “core” of LLC law. Daniel S. 
Kleinberger & Carter G. Bishop, The Next Generation: The Revised Uniform Limited Liability Com-
pany Act, 62 Bus. Law. 515, 544 (2007); see also Rev. Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 502 cmt. (2006), 6B 
U.L.A. 497 (2008) (“One of the most fundamental characteristics of LLC law is its fidelity to the 
‘pick your partner’ principle. This section is the core of the Act’s provisions reflecting and protect-
ing that principle.”). And limited partnerships also reflect this principle. See Daniel S. Kleinberger, 
A User’s Guide to the New Uniform Limited Partnership Act, 37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 583, 597 (2004) 
(“Article 7 . . . reflect[s] the ‘pick your partner’ approach that is characteristic of partnership law.”); 
see also Rev. Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 703 cmt. (2001), 6A U.L.A. 464 (2008).
73 The law is actually a little more nuanced than this statement implies. A partner can trans-
fer its “interest in the partnership.” See, e.g., Unif. P’ship Act § 26 (1914), 6 pt. II U.L.A. 349 (2001); 
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such that both voluntary and involuntary assignees end up honoring the 
“pick your partner” principle.74
The importance of this principle is further emphasized by contrasting 
the charging order remedy with the remedy available to creditors of debtors 
that own shares in a corporation. In that situation, if a debtor defaults, 
the creditor can foreclose and obtain full and unfettered ownership of the 
shareholders’ stock in the corporation.75 This right exists regardless of the 
size or complexity of the corporation76 and gives the foreclosing party all of 
the rights and elements of ownership associated with the foreclosed shares, 
Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 502 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 156 (2001). But this “interest in the partnership” 
is not what we generally think of as a “partnership interest.” It is, instead, merely a share of profits, 
losses, and rights to distributions. See id. It is only this “bare economic interest” (or “distributional 
interest”) that is freely transferable as personal property—a “full partnership interest” (with its 
attendant right to management, information, etc.) is not transferable without unanimous partner 
approval. See, e.g., Unif. P’ship Act § 18, 6 pt. II U.L.A. 101 (2001); Rev. Unif. P’ship Act §§ 401, 
501, 503, 6 pt. I U.L.A. 133, 155, 156–57 (2001).
74 See Rev. Unif. P’ship Act §§ 501, 504 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 133, 160 (2001); Rev. Unif. 
Ltd. P’ship Act (2001) §§ 702, 703, 6A U.L.A. 461–62, 463 (2008); Rev. Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act
§§ 502, 503 (2006), 6B U.L.A. 496–99 (2008); see also In re Lucas, 107 B.R. 332, 336 (Bankr. D.N.M. 
1989) (“Any assignee of the partnership interest merely entitles the assignee to receive the profits 
to which the partner would otherwise be entitled.”); Kellis v. Ring, 155 Cal. Rptr. 297, 299 (Ct. App. 
1979) (internal quotation marks omitted) (“While [the creditor] has a right to receive the share of 
the profits or other compensation by way of income, or the return of his contributions to which his 
assignor would otherwise be entitled, he has no right to interfere in the management of the limited 
partnership.”); Madison Hills Ltd. P’ship II v. Madison Hills, Inc., 644 A.2d 363, 367 (Conn. App. 
Ct. 1994) (“[A] charging creditor does not become a full partner [and] is not entitled to manage 
the partnership . . . .”); Brant v. Krilich, 835 N.E.2d 582, 592 n.20 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005) (“There is no 
reason why our courts should disregard the intent of the General Assembly to protect the close–
knit structure of a LLC and violate the other members’ interests and rights by declaring that they 
must accept a judgment creditor of a member into full membership with all the rights appurtenant 
thereto when the judgment debtor could not transfer those rights himself.”); Green v. Bellerive 
Condominiums Ltd. P’ship, 763 A.2d 252, 261–62 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 2000) (holding that the fun-
damental management rights of a partner are not transferred to a judgment creditor by a charging 
order); Zokaites v. Pittsburgh Irish Pubs, LLC, 962 A.2d 1220, 1226 n.4 (Pa. Super. Ct. 2008) (“There 
is no justification for this Court to ignore the intent of our Legislature to protect the close–knit 
structure of a limited liability company and violate the other members’ interests and rights by de-
claring that they must accept a judgment creditor of a member into full membership with all the 
rights appurtenant thereto when the judgment debtor could not transfer those rights himself.”). 
But see Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging Order 
Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 235 (“[T]he charging order never truly had anything to do with 
the pick–your–partner principle and the anti–transfer restrictions.”).
75 See, e.g., Stephen R. Looney & Ronald A. Levin, Limited Liability Companies Classified as 
S Corporations – Part II, SN067 A.L.I.–ABA 961, 971 (2008).
76 See, e.g., Citizens United v. FEC, 558 U.S. 310, 354 (2010). In this case the Court sup-
ported its reasoning with evidence that that “96% of the 3 million businesses that belong to the 
U.S. Chamber of Commerce have fewer than 100 employees” and “more than 75% of corporations 
whose income is taxed under federal law have less than $1 million in receipts per year.” Id. (citations 
omitted). 
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including the right to vote, to participate in management, and to request 
information.77
The rights of a creditor who lends to a shareholder, then, are significantly 
greater than the rights of a creditor who lends to a partnership. Given that 
there is no reason to believe that creditors of partners would differ from 
creditors of shareholders, the difference must lie within the nature of the 
entity, so we come again to the pick your partner principle: because of the 
structure of corporations and the manner in which they are governed,78 it 
is simply more important to be able to pick your partner (for the reasons 
discussed above) than it is to be able to pick your fellow shareholder.79
Charging orders, then, are only necessary to weight the scales in favor of 
business–owner debtors when the nature of the business entity exposes 
other owners to unfair liability or liquidation.
These concerns and historical circumstances all work together to explain 
the circumstances and legal issues that gave rise to the charging order 
and its unique balancing of debtor and creditor interests. The law is not 
stagnant, though, and the charging order has evolved significantly over 
time, contracting in some ways and expanding in others. This evolution is 
important to examine, as it lends additional insight into the current nature 
and scope of the charging order. 
77 See Model Bus. Corp. Act §§ 7,8 (4th ed. 2008). Corporations can issue many different 
classes of shares with many different characteristics. See, e.g., Model Bus. Corp. Act § 6.01 (4th 
ed. 2008). So it is conceivable that a given class of shares may not have some or any of the rights 
we generally associate with traditional common stock (i.e., voting rights, profit participation, etc.). 
And, of course, the foreclosing party only inherits the rights actually inherent in the foreclosed 
stock.
78 An explanation of corporate governance is beyond the scope of this Article. Suffice it 
to say that: (a) corporations are limited liability entities such that shareholders are not subject 
to liability for the actions of their fellow shareholders in the same way that partners are, and (b) 
shareholders have a less direct role in the management and control of a corporation, given that cor-
porations are generally controlled by officers and directors. Cf. David G. Yosifon, Consumer Lock–in 
and the Theory of the Firm, 35 Seattle U. L. Rev. 1429, 1442 n.58 (2012) (“[A]ll partners have a right 
to control the partnership and can, unlike shareholders, attend directly to the value of their own 
investment.”). See generally Larry E. Ribstein, Limited Liability and Theories of the Corporation, 50 
Md. L. Rev. 80 (1991) (discussing corporate shareholder limited liability).
79 This is particularly true in the case of minority partners. That is because minority partners 
do not have the level of organizational control necessary to deflect the potential predations of a 
creditor that steps into a position of control. As an example, assume that three partners—X, Y, 
and Z—each own 1/3 of XYZ Partnership. If A gets a judgment against X and thereafter takes X’s 
interest in XYZ Partnership, neither Y nor Z is at an extreme disadvantage. While it is true that 
both Y and Z likely still have a number of objections to A’s involvement (they may not know A, 
they are potentially subject to liability, etc.), Y and Z continue to control the partnership, through 
their 2/3 ownership. As a counter–example, assume the same arrangement, except that X owns 60%, 
and Y and Z each own 20%. Now, if A gets a judgment against X and thereafter takes X’s interest 
in XYZ Partnership, both Y and Z are at an extreme disadvantage. A, a stranger to the partnership, 
now has the ability to control, and even terminate, the business entity.
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B. Early Adoption, Evolution, and Perception of the Charging Order
Gaining traction for all of the reasons set forth herein, the charging order 
made its first appearance in an American uniform statute in the Uniform 
Partnership Act of 1914 (UPA).80 This iteration codified the charging order, 
limited its effect, and strongly protected the pick your partner principle:
[The] statute made clear that a judgment creditor of any partner could 
seek a court order charging the interest of the partner with the amount 
of the unsatisfied judgment. The statute granted the court the power 
to appoint a receiver to receive the profit distributions and to make all 
other orders, directions, accounts, and inquiries which the debtor partner 
might have made. The same statute also contemplated the creditor 
could foreclose on its charging order lien and the partnership interest 
could be redeemed at any time before the foreclosure sale. However, the 
purchaser–assignee could only become a partner with the consent of all 
the remaining partners. While the original charging order statute was 
silent regarding “other” rights acquired by the purchaser at a foreclosure 
sale, other provisions made clear that the purchase did not dissolve 
the partnership or entitle the assignee to (i) interfere in management 
or administration of the partnership business or affairs, (ii) require 
any information or account of partnership transactions, or (iii) inspect 
partnership books. The foreclosure sale only entitled the purchaser–
assignee to receive the profits to which the assigning–selling partner 
would otherwise have been entitled. Moreover to make matters even 
more clear, a separate statute indicated that a partner’s right in specific 
partnership property was not subject to attachment or execution except 
on a claim against the partnership itself.81
This language was picked up in 1916 by the Limited Partnership Act,82
and, from there, the concept was statutorily cemented into American 
jurisprudence. The Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 1976 with 
the 1985 amendments,83 the Revised Uniform Limited Partnership Act of 
2001,84 and the Revised Uniform Partnership Act of 199785 (RUPA) all 
adopted similar language.86 And the charging order made its way into LLC 
law when it was adopted by the Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of 
199687 and the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act of 2006.88
As the various charging order statutes filtered through the various 
uniform acts and throughout all fifty states, the manner in which 
legislatures, courts, and lawyers viewed and utilized this remedy evolved. 
80 Unif. P’ship Act § 28 (1914), 6 pt. II U.L.A. 341 (2001); Bishop, Desiderata: The Single 
Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging Order Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 231.
81 Id. at 231–32 (footnotes omitted).
82 Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging Order 
Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 232.
83 Rev. Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 703 (amended 1985), 6B U.L.A. 313 (2008).
84 Rev. Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 703 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 463 (2008).
85 Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 504 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 160 (2001).
86 There have been, however, a number of changes in that language as the charging order and 
its underlying concepts evolved over time. See generally infra Part II. 
87 Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 504 (1996), 6B U.L.A. 605 (2008).
88 Rev. Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 503 (2006), 6B U.L.A. 498–99 (2008); see supra note 40.
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Though it is outside the scope of this Article to trace this process precisely,89
it is possible to generally describe that evolution in the broader context of 
how the perception and utilization of the remedy has changed over time. 
In particular, it is possible to describe this development in the context of 
two early philosophies of charging order interpretation.90 The divergence 
of these two philosophies, one that viewed the charging order as a self–
contained remedy and one that viewed it as part of a broader package 
of creditor rights, reflects (and ultimately explains) both the early lack 
of certainty surrounding charging orders and the more recent, perceived 
impotence of the remedy. 
The view of the charging order as part of a broader range of remedies was 
articulated by Lord Lindley in applying the charging order statute under 
the English Partnership Act. 91 This philosophy dictated that the charging 
order, in and of itself, “simply encumbers the interest [and] does not compel 
the firm to do anything about paying the creditor.”92 A charging order was 
merely a first step that imposed no obligation on the partnership or on 
anyone else and that required any creditor desiring real compensation to 
go back to the court for further help.93 The charging order alone, then, was 
essentially worthless.94 This early, or English, view contrasts with a broader 
view articulated by Professor William Lewis, the principal architect of the 
UPA.95 This alternative, or American, view perceived the charging order as a 
more useful remedy in that it affirmatively directed a debtor–partner’s share 
of profits to the creditor.96 The other avenues of recourse described by the 
charging order statutes were available, but primarily as a way to enforce the 
primary charging order itself.97
These two lines of thought regarding the charging order predictably filtered 
into state law, though not in the manner generally perceived. It is commonly 
believed that the broader view of charging orders has been adopted and 
that this view gives the remedy more substance.98 While the American view 
has predominated legislatively, the English view has done so in the courts; 
89 Various charging orders have been adopted in the various states hundreds of times over 
the last 100 years.
90 See, e.g., Gose, supra note 43, at 7–11.
91 Lord Lindley was the author of the opinion in the Brown, Janson & Co. case, cited above. 
See supra note 60 and accompanying text.
92 Gose, supra note 43, at 8.
93 This help could take the form of ordering a receiver, of ordering an accounting, or even of 
selling the debtor’s interest in the partnership. Id. at 8–9.
94 See id. at 8.
95 Id. at 10.
96 See id. at 11.
97 See id. at 10.
98 See id. at 11 (“Generally the cases appear to proceed on the liberal philosophy of inter-
pretation indicated by Professor Lewis rather than by the apparently narrower views suggested by 
Lord Lindley.”).
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this mismatch of perception goes a long way toward explaining the weak 
development and utilization of the charging order.
The American view is manifest in the statutes in a number of different 
ways.99 In particular, modern statutes generally differ in two large and relevant 
ways, and these differences seem to indicate that the statutes presume that the 
charging order stands alone, in line with the philosophy of Professor Lewis. 
These differences relate to exclusivity and the ultimate remedy of foreclosure.100
As to exclusivity in the context of LLCs, approximately thirty–four states 
have indicated that the charging order is exclusive, while the other sixteen 
have remained silent.101 Similarly, some jurisdictions have explicitly addressed 
foreclosure, with twelve states102 (Alaska, Delaware, Florida, Georgia, Maine, 
Michigan, New Hampshire, New Jersey, Oklahoma, South Dakota, Texas, and 
Wyoming) specifically precluding it, and two others103 (Nevada, and Virginia) 
99 See Carter G. Bishop, Fifty State Series: LLC Charging Order Statute Table 5–51 (Suffolk 
Univ. Law Sch. Research, Working Paper No. 10–03, 2013), available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstract_id=1542244. As a matter of pure historical adoption, it appears that the follow-
ing jurisdictions base their statute on the ULLCA: California, Colorado, Delaware, the District 
of Columbia, Florida, Hawaii, Idaho, Iowa, Kentucky, Maine, Maryland, Michigan, Mississippi, 
Montana, Nebraska, South Carolina, South Dakota, Texas, Utah, Vermont, Virginia, and West 
Virginia. The rest of the jurisdictions (Alabama, Alaska, Arizona, Arkansas, Connecticut, Georgia, 
Kansas, Louisiana, Massachusetts, Minnesota, Missouri, Nevada, New Hampshire, New Jersey, 
New Mexico, New York, North Carolina, North Dakota, Ohio, Oklahoma, Oregon, Rhode Island, 
Tennessee, Washington, Wisconsin, and Wyoming) appear to have based their statutes on RULPA. 
See id. There are numerous differences laced throughout the various state statutes, and a review of 
these differences is outside the scope of this Article. See id.; see also Bishop, Desiderata: The Single 
Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging Order Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 236 
(“While it is clear that every state partnership and LLC charging order statute was patterned after 
one of the uniform law versions, the patchwork differences in language are difficult to explain.”). 
100 Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging Or-
der Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 236–37. Therein, Professor Bishop identifies “three areas of 
comparative importance.” In addition to the two discussed herein, he also discusses the fact that 
some statutes make a distinction between a multi–member LLC and a single member LLC. Id.
101 See Bishop, Fifty State Series: LLC Charging Order Statute Table, supra note 99. These 
statutes specify that the charging order is the exclusive remedy “by which a judgment creditor of 
a partner or partner’s transferee may satisfy a judgment out of the judgment debtor’s transferable 
interest in the partnership.” See id. (quoting Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 504(e) (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 
160 (2001)).
102 Alaska Stat. § 10.50.380(c) (2008); Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.433(8) (West Supp. 2013) 
(expressly precluding foreclosure for non–single member LLCs); Ga. Code Ann. § 14–11–504(b) 
(2003 & Supp. 2009) (prohibiting foreclosure “except as otherwise provided in the articles of or-
ganization or a written operating agreement”); Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 31, § 1573(3) (2011); Mich. 
Comp. Laws Ann. § 450.4507(5) (West 2010); N.H. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 304–C:126 (LexisNexis 
2012) (expressly precluding foreclosure for non–single member LLCs); N.J. Stat. Ann. § 42:2B–
45 (West 2004); Okla. Stat. tit. 18, § 2034 (West 1999 & Supp. 2010); S.D. Codified Laws § 
47–34A–504(e) (2007 & Supp. 2009); Tex. Bus. Orgs. Code Ann. § 101.112(c) (West 2010); Wyo. 
Stat. Ann. § 17–29–503(g) (2011).
103 See Del. Code Ann. tit. 6, § 18–703 (2005); Nev. Rev. Stat. § 86.401(2)(a) (2011); Va. 
Code Ann. § 13.1–1041.1 (2006).
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eliminating foreclosure language with the intent of prohibiting it.104 The 
importance of these limitations is subject to some doubt,105 but the implication 
and intent are not. This cabining of remedies demonstrates an ongoing hostility 
to creditors of members and a further willingness to reallocate rights from 
owners of creditor property rights to non–debtor members. Importantly, it 
also indicates that legislatures perceive the charging order as so broad and 
potentially useful a tool that no other remedy is needed and that, in fact, it 
needs explicit limitation. 
That view, however, is not held by lawyers and courts. These participants, 
instead, view the charging order in the context of the English view—as 
a weak, unhelpful remedy that does little to nothing on its own. There 
exists in the bar a general perception that people can place their assets into 
an LLC and effectively put them beyond the reach of potential creditors 
because charging orders provide so little satisfaction.106 In general, the 
thinking goes, charging orders only allow creditors to claim certain, limited 
distributions, and the debtor can avoid even that by ensuring that there are 
no distributions.
These two contradictory philosophies applied in tandem have led to a toxic 
situation in which charging orders are viewed as virtually impotent. On the 
one hand, the operative statutes are drafted narrowly, reflecting the legislature’s 
belief that the charging order is a broadly operative statute that needs to be 
carefully restrained so that third party business owners are properly protected. 
On the other hand, judges (and, concomitantly, lawyers) view the charging 
order as weak and so view statutory restraints and claw–backs as even further 
evidence of the relative uselessness of the remedy. This state of affairs has led to 
a clear deterioration of the usefulness and legitimacy of the charging order as a 
property right of any significant worth or value.
104 See Bishop, Fifty State Series: LLC Charging Order Statute Table, supra note 99. The re-
maining states either expressly permit foreclosure or are silent without any intent to eliminate 
foreclosure as a possibility. See id.
105 See infra note 107 and accompanying text. But see infra Part III.B (discussing the utility of 
various avenues available to the holder of a charging order, including foreclosure).
106 See, e.g., Susan Kalinka, Assignment of an Interest in a Limited Liability Company and the 
Assignment of Income, 64 U. Cin. L. Rev. 443, 483 (1996) (“[A] judgment creditor who obtains a 
charging order against a member’s interest in an LLC obtains only the right to receive the distribu-
tions to which the member was entitled. If neither the LLC’s operating agreement nor its members 
authorize nonliquidating distributions from the LLC, the charging order may be worthless to the 
judgment creditor.”); see also Jacob Stein, Building Stumbling Blocks: A Practical Take on Charging 
Orders, Bus. Entities, Sept.–Oct. 2006, at 28, 64 (footnote omitted) (“As a practical matter, credi-
tors rarely choose to pursue charging orders. A charging order is not a very effective debt collection 
tool. A creditor may find itself holding a charging order, without any ability to determine when the 
judgment will be paid off. Practitioners should remember that any uncertainty surrounding charg-
ing orders is uncertainty for both the debtor and the creditor. This uncertainty forces most creditors 
to settle the judgment with the debtor, on terms more acceptable to the debtor, rather than pursue 
the charging order remedy.”). In the end, then, the view is that charging orders provide protection 
to debtors, not compensation to creditors.
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Moreover, this view of impotence has considerable academic support. In 
fact, some scholars claim that these variations and different schools of thought 
are not important because the very foundation of charging order simply is 
not particularly meaningful.107 In particular, the first round of revised uniform 
statutes that incorporated language limiting foreclosure rights and providing 
for exclusivity can be read as merely underscoring then–existing law.108 This is 
so for a couple of reasons. 
First, partnerships (as well as limited partnerships, limited liability 
partnerships, and LLCs) are, and were, treated as separate entities.109 This 
is clear under RUPA,110 the limited partnership statutes,111 and the LLC 
statutes.112 Interestingly, it was also true under UPA, the first iteration of 
partnership law and the first American incorporation of the charging order. 
As discussed above, UPA did not treat a partnership as a separate entity 
for most purposes,113 which meant that partnership property was effectively 
owned by the partners individually.114 Aggregate treatment of partnership 
property did not, however, carry through to creditors of individual partners 
in that those creditors were not permitted to attach or execute thereon.115
This prohibition on creditor interference arguably obviates at least some of 
the need for the charging order remedy.
Similarly, to the extent the charging order was intended to protect the pick 
your partner principle, pre–existing law may have already provided sufficient 
protection. Recall that only “part” of a partnership interest is transferable.116
Under American law, partners have long had the right to transfer an economic 
interest in their entity.117 This transferable interest, however, is distinctly limited. 
107 See Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging 
Order Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 233–35, 237–40 (arguing that the charging order simply 
displaces other collection procedures and does not accomplish anything significantly novel or im-
portant). But see infra note 159 and accompanying text (discussing the extent to which foreclosure 
of a charging order is, in fact, a true danger). 
108 See Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging 
Order Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 233–34.
109 Id. at 235 (“American law . . . regards a partnership or LLC as an entity separate from its 
owners . . . .”).
110 Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 201 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 91 (2001).
111 Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 104 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 366 (2008) (“A limited partnership is an 
entity distinct from its partners.”).
112 Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 201 (1996), 6B U.L.A. 574 (2008); Rev. Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. 
Act § 104 (2006), 6B U.L.A. 437 (2008) (“A limited liability company is an entity distinct from its 
members.”).
113 Supra note 54 and accompanying text.
114 Unif. P’ship Act § 25(1) (1914), 6 pt. II U.L.A. 294 (2001) (“A partner is co–owner with 
his partners of specific partnership property holding as a tenant in partnership.”).
115 Id. § 25(2)(c), 6 pt. II U.L.A. 294 (2001) (“A partner’s right in specific partnership property 
is not subject to attachment or execution, except on a claim against the partnership.”).
116 Supra notes 73–74 and accompanying text.
117 Referred to as a “bare economic interest” above, this is referred to as a “transferable inter-
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In particular, it does not pass to the recipient the right to participate in the 
management or conduct of the company.118 And this is the only interest that 
an owner can pass to a third party without unanimous approval of all other 
owners.119 As such, no one can enter into a partnership entity (in a full sense, 
as a full member or partner, with the right to participate in—i.e., disrupt—
the conduct of the entity) without the non–transferring partners’ approval. 
Accordingly, the argument goes, the charging order is not really needed to 
protect the integrity of the pick your partner principle. Nobody, not even 
involuntary assignees, can succeed to an owner’s interest, so there is no need 
for a charging order to serve an intermediate role to prevent creditors from 
intruding.
But this general view of impotence is incorrect. It is not that the charging 
order is not needed or is not of independent value. Instead, the true nature 
of the charging order has been forgotten as the entire system of partnership 
law120 has grown over time in an organic, holistic sense, as opposed to a linear, 
or direct, sense. What started out as an attempt to address serious concerns 
with respect to partnerships, as utilized in early commercial settings, grew in 
tandem with other elements of partnership law. These elements—viewing the 
partnership as a separate entity and requiring unanimity for the admission of 
additional partners—may ultimately affect the need for charging orders, but all 
of these developed together. 
Similarly, the other areas of law specifically concerned with business 
associations other than general partnerships also developed alongside the 
growth of the charging order, all the while borrowing from earlier concepts of 
partnership law. For instance, the limited partnership and the LLC were created 
with the specific intent to address a number of perceived weaknesses inherent 
in general partnership and corporation law.121 They did this by strengthening 
est” under both partnership law and LLC law. Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 502 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 
156 (2001); Rev. Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 701 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 461 (2008); Rev. Unif. Ltd. Liab. 
Co. Act § 501 (2006), 6B U.L.A. 496 (2008).
118 See, e.g., Rev. Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 502(a)(3)(A) (2006), 6B U.L.A. 496 (2008).
119 See, e.g., id. at § 401(d)(3), 6B U.L.A. 478 (2008) (stating the default rule that a third party 
cannot become a member without approval of all members). 
120 “Partnership law,” as used herein, refers generically to that body of law that has developed 
with respect to non–corporate business entities. See, e.g., Saul Levmore, Uncorporations and the 
Delaware Strategy, 2005 U. Ill. L. Rev. 195, 196 n.4 (“[T]he terms uncorporations and uncorporate 
law interchangeably with expressions such as noncorporate forms, or partnership law and limited 
liability company law, meaning always to refer to the law enabling and regulating noncorporate 
forms of business activity.”). To the extent that it is important or relevant to focus on general part-
nerships (as opposed to limited partnerships or LLCs), this Article specifically states that “general 
partnerships” are at issue.
121 See, e.g., William J. Carney, Limited Liability Companies: Origins and Antecedents, 66 U. 
Colo. L. Rev. 855, 874–75 (1995) (footnotes omitted) (“Once the United States entered the era of 
general corporation laws, demand for a noncorporate alternative did not disappear. Beginning in 
1874, Pennsylvania, Michigan, New Jersey, and Ohio adopted statutes authorizing ‘limited partner-
ship associations’ or ‘partnership associations,’ which gave members limited liability. These statutes 
charging orders & property rights 7252013– 2014 ]
the entity concept, restricting liability for limited partners and members, and by 
mimicking general partnership law regarding admission of new owners.122 These 
new concepts were not created out of whole cloth, however, and consistently 
drew from UPA and/or RUPA as they were fashioned.123 This meant that, even 
as the underlying law of partnership was changing, and even as the specifics 
of the charging order concept were changing simultaneously, both were being 
sampled and utilized in substantial measure for new entities with differing 
concepts. 
The result is a remedy well–grounded in real world concerns that has been 
made practically moot by other areas of partnership law and laws applicable to 
other business associations. The charging order began as a compromise intended 
to protect uniquely vulnerable persons associated with general partnerships 
(non–debtor partners) from the forced intrusions of third party creditors, but 
it has ended up as a forgotten and nearly vestigial element of partnership law. 
Of course, this circuitous, non–linear evolution is not new or novel.124
Indeed, it does not change the basic state of the law or the fact that we 
now have the charging order, a distinct remedy unique to non–corporate 
business associations, which grants a suite of privileges to creditors that 
effectively constitute a choate property right. This is particularly so when 
the charging order is viewed as what it truly is—a choate property right 
intended to balance the rights of creditors, debtors, and third parties.125
were apparently adopted to relieve entrepreneurs of some of the burdens of the corporate form . . 
. . Finally, the limited partnership appeared in its modern incarnation in 1916, with promulgation 
of the Uniform Limited Partnership Act. While the limited partnership has enjoyed considerable 
popularity, it has not become a viable substitute for the corporation . . . .”).
122 See, e.g., Rev. Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 301 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 416 (2008); Rev. Unif. Ltd. 
Liab. Co. Act § 401 (2006), 6B U.L.A. 478 (2008).
123 See, e.g., Robert R. Keatinge, The Partnership Agreement and Third Parties: ReRULPA § 
110(b)(13) v. RUPA § 103(b)(10), 37 Suffolk U. L. Rev. 873, 873–74 (2004) (footnote omitted) (“Un-
incorporated business organizations organized under [these] uniform acts . . . have several common 
characteristics.”).
124 See Allan C. Hutchinson, Evolution and the Common Law 17–18 (2005) (arguing 
that law develops from an amalgam of different means, as opposed to an organic, linear process).
125 The National Conference on Commissioners on Uniform State Laws’s (NCCUSL) 
explanation of the role of the charging order supports this view:
This section balances the needs of a judgment creditor of a partner or transferee 
with the needs of the limited partnership and non–debtor partners and transferees. 
The section achieves that balance by allowing the judgment creditor to collect on the 
judgment through the transferable interest of the judgment debtor while prohibiting 
interference in the management and activities of the limited partnership.
Under this section, the judgment creditor of a partner or transferee is entitled to a 
charging order against the relevant transferable interest. While in effect, that order 
entitles the judgment creditor to whatever distributions would otherwise be due to the 
partner or transferee whose interest is subject to the order. The creditor has no say in 
the timing or amount of those distributions. The charging order does not entitle the 
creditor to accelerate any distributions or to otherwise interfere with the management 
and activities of the limited partnership.
Rev. Unif. Ltd. P’ship Act § 703 cmt. (2001), 6A U.L.A. 464 (2008). 
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III. The Charging Order as a
Choate Creditor Property Right
As we can see, charging orders have changed over time. They came into 
existence in the long tradition of creditor property rights, that area of law that 
seeks to grant to creditors ownership of debtor property. Their very creation, 
though, constitutes a compromise, an attempt to accommodate unique 
partnership issues and to balance creditor needs with those of debtors and 
innocent third parties. But this initial balancing has come to favor debtor 
rights too heavily in the context of LLC charging orders, at least in practice, 
and the charging order remedy has become increasingly unmoored from its 
historical roots as a creditor remedy. Indeed, rather than being viewed as a 
limited deviation from the larger suite of creditor rights, too often the charging 
order is viewed as a throw–away remedy, a non–right that effectively offers no 
real solace or value to a creditor.
This is neither appropriate nor inevitable. Emphasizing the nature of the 
charging order, as part of the broader galaxy of creditor property rights, refocuses 
our analysis on the purpose of those rights and stresses the principle underlying 
charging orders. Re–casting of the nature and aim of the remedy is significant 
because, once one accepts charging orders as a choate creditor property right, 
they gain substance, possessing the various attributes that generally flow from 
property ownership and vastly increasing in both scope and reach.
A. Purpose of Charging Orders and Creditor Property Rights
Property has been famously described as “that sole and despotic dominion 
which one man claims and exercises over the external things of the world, in 
total exclusion of the right of any other individual in the universe.”126 It is that 
individualized right of exploitation that creates value, and the creation and 
recognition of creditor property rights takes that value from the debtor and 
takes it for the benefit of the creditor. As discussed above, this institutionalized 
expropriation (or “execution”) arose directly in response to the need to 
protect creditors by granting them a useful remedy and thereby stimulating 
commercially beneficial economic activity.127 In other words, the creation of 
creditor property rights is meant to make creditors whole, and its focus is quite 
rightly not on debtors, third parties, or society. Instead, its focus is on creditors 
and on how the law can effectively guard their interests by ensuring that they 
get as close as possible to the position they would have occupied had the debtor 
fully performed all of its obligations.128
126 2 William Blackstone, Commentaries *2.
127 See supra Part I.B.
128 See, e.g., 3 Debtor–Creditor Law § 27.03 (Matthew Bender 2010) (explaining that 
creditors can pursue execution and so reach debtor assets in order to satisfy properly effected judg-
ments).
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Recognizing that the charging order is a type of creditor property right 
is a useful insight because it brings the focus back to the real purpose behind 
charging orders: taking property from debtors and transferring it to creditors. 
Now, it is of course true that charging orders represent a compromise, as 
discussed above, and that partnership law and charging orders developed 
such that debtor and third party interests receive more consideration in this 
context than they do in the context of other creditor property rights. But that 
re–balancing of competing interests does not change the fundamental nature of 
the charging order as a creditor property right.
One can see this by again contrasting the charging order with execution 
on a debtor’s ownership in a corporation. Both a charging order that affects 
a partner’s interest in a partnership, and a writ of execution that affects a 
shareholder’s interest in a corporation, create creditor property rights by 
transferring the ownership of a business entity from the debtor to the creditor. 
Both also expose third parties (third party partners and shareholders) to the 
potential risks associated with being forced to do business with the creditor, a 
stranger to the business venture.129 The law has given additional protection to 
partners due to the unique nature of that entity, but the underlying circumstances 
are effectively identical: valuable assets owned by defaulting debtors should be 
seized and liquidated so that the value thereof can be transferred to deserving 
creditors. The fact that a quirk of partnership law has resulted in a lessening 
of the harsh manner in which the creditor achieves recompense should not 
distract from the underlying goal of creating creditor property rights.
Unfortunately, that is precisely what has happened in this area of the law. 
Instead of recognizing that the charging order is meant to compensate creditors 
by creating property rights in debtor business interests, judges, lawyers, and even 
academics have instead focused on debtor rights and the actual and perceived 
weaknesses associated with the remedy.130 From a practical standpoint, most 
parties simply believe that they can avoid the effects of a pure charging 
order simply by stopping distributions or recharacterizing them as salary or 
something else.131 If, instead, these parties would focus on the underlying nature 
of the charging order as a creditor property right, they would perceive just how 
concrete this remedy is and how significantly it can advance creditors’ positions 
(and, conversely, hurt debtors’ positions).132 The next section develops this in 
129 See supra note 71–72 and accompanying text.
130 See supra note 106.
131 Id. Indeed, this is a significant part of the reason that LLCs have become so important in 
modern planning and commercial contexts. See, e.g., John T. Mulligan, Asset–Protection Strategies for 
Physicians, Am. Bankr. Inst. J., Oct. 2003, at 22, 50 (emphasis added) (“Family limited partnerships 
or limited–liability companies can offer significant asset protection in that, if properly structured, 
on an ongoing basis the creditor of a partner or member could only receive a charging order against 
the individual’s interest in the partnership or LLC.”).
132 See Carter G. Bishop, LLC Charging Orders: A Jurisdictional and Governing Law Quag-
mire, Bus. Entities, May–June 2010, at 14, 17–18 (quoting Taylor v. S & M Lamp Co., 12 Cal. Rptr. 
323, 328 (Dist. Ct. App. 1961) (“Charging orders ‘are not intended to protect a debtor partner against 
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greater detail, focusing on the nature of the charging order as a property interest 
and analyzing the sorts of concrete rights and remedies that traditionally flow 
out of such rights.
B. Giving Charging Orders the Weight of “Real” Property
Recognizing charging orders for what they are should reverse the existing 
view of their impotence. Instead of viewing them as a way of preventing creditors 
from interrupting partnerships, courts should seek to uphold them in the same 
way that they do numerous other types of property interests. Of course, they do 
not constitute a full and unfettered property interest, but that does not matter. 
In this sense, they are analogous to other “compromised” property interests, 
which are generally zealously protected by our legal system. 
One example is property with an attached restraint on alienation. This can 
arise in connection with real or personal property, and, just like the charging 
order, this specific sort of ownership constitutes a compromised set of rights 
creating a need to balance rights of competing parties.133 On the one hand, the 
party who owns the property seeks full and free alienability, and, on the other 
hand, the party who imposed the restraint seeks its enforcement. And courts 
will generally enforce the restriction.134 But they do so hesitantly.135 The law 
claims of his judgment creditors where no legitimate interest of the partnership, or of the remaining 
or former partners is to be served.’”)).
133 See, e.g., Linda L. Kreicher, Note, Much Ado About Due–on–Sale: Avoiding the Tempest in 
New York, 10 Hofstra L. Rev. 1229, 1235 (1982). Therein, Ms. Kreicher notes that the due–on–sale 
clause is a reasonable restraint on alienation, which balances the competing interests of lenders and 
borrowers. 
 The criticism that the clause is an unreasonable restraint on alienation likewise fails to 
distinguish reasonable restraints that can be removed by private agreement from those 
that cannot. The due–on–sale clause only “shifts to the lender the advantage from the 
increase in interest rates which would otherwise belong to the seller.” 
Id. at 1260 (footnotes omitted) (quoting Richard A. Epstein, Unconscionability: A Critical 
Reappraisal, 18 J.L. & Econ. 293, 312 (1975)).
134 12 William Meade Fletcher et al., Fletcher Cyclopedia of the Law of Cor-
porations § 5455 (2011) (footnote omitted) (“Courts applying common law principles have held 
that transfer restrictions constitute restraints on alienation and should be strictly construed. Under 
the rule of strict construction, the transfer restriction generally will be upheld if it is reasonable 
and lawful.”).
135 See Restatement (Third) of Prop. (Servitudes) § 3.4 (2000) (“A servitude that im-
poses a direct restraint on alienation of the burdened estate is invalid if the restraint is unreason-
able.”); 61 Am. Jur. 2d Perpetuities and Restraints on Alienation § 90 (2002); see also First Bank & 
Trust v. Novak, 747 P.2d 850, 855 (Kan. Ct. App. 1987) (“A restriction against assignment is a restraint 
on alienation, and as such it is strictly construed against the party urging the restriction.”); Wright 
v. Rub–a–Dub Car Wash, Inc., 740 So. 2d 891, 903 n.2 (Miss. 1999) (“[A] restriction against assign-
ments in that it acts as a restraint on alienation is not favored by the law and should be strictly 
construed against the lessor.”); Johnson v. Yousoofian, 930 P.2d 921, 924 (Wash. Ct. App. 1996) 
(“[L]ease covenants requiring the landlord’s consent to assignment are restraints on alienation and 
should be strictly construed.”).
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favors full and unfettered ownership and the rights that accompany it136 and so 
seeks to find and encourage that wherever possible. 
There are many examples in property law, situations where courts or 
legislatures have crafted a property interest that marks a middle course between 
or among competing interests by giving an owner something less than full and 
unfettered rights to property.137 And, time and again, the courts reflexively favor 
the holder of the property.138 They recognize that these are property interests and 
seek to honor them, attempting to magnify owner rights, simplify ownership, 
and therefore permit market forces to take effect. Even with a restraint on 
alienation, or subject to a covenant or restriction, property is still property. It is 
still a valuable right, hard fought over and jealously guarded once obtained, and 
the law seeks to maximize it by construing it, to the extent possible, as a limited 
departure from its roots. 
When it comes to charging orders, however, this independent regard and 
fealty to property rights (along with the judicial desire to adhere to the roots 
of ownership) vanishes.139 Rather than focusing on the creditor’s ownership 
interest in the debtor’s business entity, the law focuses on all the ways in which 
creditors have no effective recourse and all the ways that debtors can escape 
paying what they owe.140 This odd fixation on debtor rights, arising as it does 
136 See William A. Dreier, The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Products Liability and New 
Jersey Law—Not Quite Perfect Together, 50 Rutgers L. Rev. 2059, 2124 n.402 (1998) (quoting 
Restatement (Third) of Torts: Prods. Liab. § 12 cmt. a (1998)) (“[C]orporate law ‘favors 
the free alienability of corporate assets and limits shareholders’ exposures to liability in order 
to facilitate the formation and investment of capital.’”); John P. Strohm, Comment, Writings 
in the Margin (of Error): The Authorship Status of Sound Recordings Under United States Copy-
right Law, 34 Cumb. L. Rev. 127, 135 (2003) (“In essence, as with property in general, the law 
favors free alienability of copyright ownership . . . .”).
137 One such additional example is property fettered by real covenants and restrictions. As 
with property subject to restraints on alienation, the law reflexively favors the unconstrained use of 
law, not subject to these sorts of restrictions. See Patrick J. Rohan, Preparing Community Associations 
for the Twenty–First Century: Anticipating the Legal Problems and Possible Solutions, 73 St. John’s L. 
Rev. 3, 11 (1999) (“[Covenants and restrictions] continue to be regarded with disfavor as isolated at-
tempts by inept or mean–spirited grantors to interfere with the right of every person to enjoy their 
property to the absolute fullest.”). 
138 See, e.g., 9 Richard R. Powell, Powell on Real Property § 67.03[3] (Michael Allan 
Wolf ed., 2000) (discussing the law’s policy favoring unfettered use of land).
139 Part of this unique resistance to acknowledging the nature of charging orders perhaps 
arises from the long–standing confusion surrounding charging orders. See, e.g., Gose, supra note 
43, at 5 (“Casual conversations with American judges and lawyers reveal not only a general unfa-
miliarity with the statute but also a lack of familiarity with its theory and its meaning on the part 
of those who try to apply it. Such confusion is wholly understandable.”). And part of it perhaps 
arises because charging orders tend to arise in a limited set of circumstances that usually involve 
egregious acts of debtors. See, e.g., Elizabeth N. Kozlow, Comment, A Charging Order Conundrum: 
Is It Really the “Exclusive Remedy” of an LLC Member Judgment Creditor?, 63 Baylor L. Rev. 884, 897 
(2011) (“[C]ourts seem to balance stringent statutory language of the charging order remedy with 
the equitable result based on egregious facts.”). Whatever the cause, it is clear that charging orders 
are given significantly less respect than most other types of property interests.
140 See Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging 
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from a failure to view the charging order as an actual property right, results 
in a hodge–podge of rules created to address this unique situation, creating 
substantial uncertainty and inefficiency.141 But this state of affairs is neither 
appropriate nor necessary. If courts and practitioners more clearly understood 
the underlying nature of charging orders and focused on enlarging those rights 
rather than minimizing them, then the use and scope of these rights would 
solidify and begin to serve the purpose of creditor protection, for which they 
were created.
This can be done in a number of ways. Initially, courts and practitioners 
can simply begin to give full effect to the clear statutory language associated 
with most charging orders. Charging order statutes generally provide that a 
judgment creditor can charge the debtor’s transferable interest and that the 
court itself can (1) appoint a receiver of the distributions due or to become 
due, (2) make “all other orders, directions, accounts, and inquiries the judgment 
debtor might have made or which the circumstances . . . may require,” and 
(3) order a foreclosure of the interest subject to the charging order.142 This 
language is not all–encompassing, but it does afford a number of potential 
remedies for which lawyers can advocate, and that courts can countenance, in 
seeking to establish and protect creditor interests.143
For instance, charging order recipients can seek to protect the underlying 
value of the partnership by setting aside mortgages and liens that insiders have 
placed on partnership property.144 This can substantially increase the value and 
worth of a charging order, as it may effectively terminate a prior claimant to 
Order Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 222 (“Since the member alone retains discretionary control 
over when and if such distributions will be made, the charging order is usually ineffective because 
the member simply accumulates distributions.”).
141 See Alan M. Weinberger, Making Partners Pay Child Support: The Charging Order at 
100, 27 Hous. L. Rev. 297, 306 (1990) (footnotes omitted) (discussing the charging order in 
the context of “the considerable confusion surrounding th[e] procedure, its circuitous nature, 
and the uncertainty of recovery in the end”).
142 See, e.g., Rev. Unif. P’ship Act § 504 (1997), 6 pt. I U.L.A. 160 (2001); Rev. Unif. Ltd. 
P’ship Act § 703 (2001), 6A U.L.A. 463 (2008); Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 504 (1996), 6B U.L.A. 
605 (2008); Rev. Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 503 (2006), 6B U.L.A. 498–99 (2008). Of course, not 
every state has statutes matching these, but these serve as useful models. 
143 Note that, here, there is no necessary distinction among LLCs, partnerships, and limited 
partnerships—lawyers and courts can give weight to enabling statutes regardless of the underlying 
entity, and many of the relevant statutes are similar among the various types of entities. This is not 
necessarily true of all of the arguments made in this section. See infra note 164 and accompanying 
text.
144 Gose, supra note 43, at 12–13 (citing Windom Nat’l Bank v. Klein, 254 N.W. 602 (Minn. 
1934)) (discussing the right of an appointed receiver to set aside insider security interests). Windom 
National Bank specifically states: 
[A] receiver . . . has the right in a proper action to have adjudicated the nullity of any 
mortgage or other assignment by some but not all of the partners of their interest in 
specific property of the partnership less than the whole. Such a receiver is entitled to 
any relief under the language of the statute “which the circumstances of the case may 
require” to accomplish justice under the law. Obviously, a part of such relief is the 
avoidance of any unauthorized attempt to dispose of partnership property.
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the funds that would otherwise be distributed to the debtor partner. Similarly, 
a debtor can protect its relative rights to partnership profits by blocking an 
attempted dissolution of the partnership in order to defeat the creditor’s claim.145
This could frustrate attempts by the debtor, and the debtor’s partners, to avoid 
a direct distribution subject to the charging order, but they would nevertheless 
receive funds associated with a termination of the partnership entity. Moreover, 
if such an attempt to block dissolution fails, then the creditor can attempt to 
dictate the manner in which a sale of the partnership interest is to be made.146
Again, this power gives the creditor the ability to frustrate debtor attempts 
to somehow extract value out of the entity (by colluding to sale assets for less 
than fair market value or by transferring the assets to a controlled person or 
entity or in some other creative way) without creating a distribution available 
to the holder of the charging order. These individual remedies fall within the 
general ambit of a court’s power to make “orders, directions, accounts [sic] and 
inquiries . . . which the circumstances . . . may require” and may or may not 
involve the appointment of a receiver.147 That right—the ability to appoint an 
independent party with its own powers, prerogatives, and the capacity to review 
and monitor business activities—is an extremely powerful remedy because it 
will significantly frustrate and inhibit the normal operations of an entity.
Indeed, even more than the fact that these various sorts of actions give 
creditors specific tools to block specific misdeeds and avoidance strategies, 
the general right of a creditor to intrude into a business entity’s affairs and 
affect its course of operations will affect the balance of power between debtors 
and creditors holding a charging order. This ability to interject is anathema 
to business. It exposes private business activity to scrutiny, prevents speedy 
deliberation, and ultimately harms an entity’s ability to conduct business. In 
fact, it effectively creates the very sort of situation that the charging order was 
meant to prevent: one wherein the creditor interrupts the entity and the solvent 
partners.148 Of course, exposing partners to scrutiny is not the same as taking 
away their property, but it still upsets non–debtors and the entity at large. This 
creates leverage because creditors who can affect partnership operations should 
be able to pressure the entity, the non–debtor partners, and the debtor partner 
to make chargeable distributions and thereby satisfy the creditor’s claims.
And creditors have this power even without considering their statutory 
right to foreclose. This right creates additional leverage, involving the 
creditor even more intimately in the affairs of the business entity and 
the non–debtor partners. However, foreclosure in this context is not as 
straightforward as in most other circumstances, and it is important here to 
understand precisely what rights the creditor possesses. Notably, foreclosure 
Windom Nat’l Bank v. Klein, 254 N.W. 602, 605 (Minn. 1934).
145 Gose, supra note 43, at 15.
146 See id. at 17.
147 See id. at 16 (internal quotation marks omitted).
148 See supra note 58 and accompanying text.
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does not constitute a wholesale transfer of ownership to a judgment creditor 
(or to a purchaser at a foreclosure sale). This is because, in line with the 
discussion above regarding a “bare economic interest,” the creditor (or 
purchaser at the foreclosure sale) does not receive what we commonly think 
of as a “full membership interest.”149 Instead, the creditor receives what is 
known as a distributional interest.150 This interest is something less than 
a full membership interest in that it does not entitle the holder thereof 
to participate in the management of the LLC, demand information, or 
inspect company records.151 So the creditor receives all economic rights of 
the LLC (rather than just the temporary right to receive distributions until 
the underlying judgment is satisfied), but it cannot dissolve the company to 
gain access to the underlying assets or otherwise control the entity.152
Additionally, even if one could put aside the underlying nature of 
what a foreclosure sale yields, gaining ownership in a debtor’s interest in 
a partnership entity is likely to be compromised due to transferability and 
liquidity issues. For example, the interest is likely to be worth less than fair 
market value in the creditor’s hands because most LLCs are not publicly 
traded.153 The vast majority of foreclosed LLC interests involve small, 
149 See Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act §§ 503(d)–(e), 601 (1996), 6B U.L.A. 604, 607–08 (2008).
150 See id. § 503(a), 6B U.L.A. 603 (2008).
151 Id. § 503(d), 6B U.L.A. 604 (2008). This holds under the current, strict view of charging 
orders. If courts were to more creatively utilize the discretion granted to them in most charging 
order statutes by ordering a transfer of management and economic rights, as is advocated above, 
then many of these arguments would be entirely moot.
152 Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging Or-
der Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 226. Professor Bishop discusses this difficulty in the context 
of a single member LLC, specifically, though he likely exaggerates its significance. Still, there is 
no getting around the fact that the creditor essentially becomes a “naked assignee” instead of a 
member and so is not protected by fiduciary duties or entitled to “meddle” with the management 
of the company. See Kleinberger, Bishop & Geu, supra note 66, at 32 (analyzing charging orders in 
the substantially similar realm of limited partnerships). Additionally, a number of commentators 
believe that receiving a charging order exposes the creditor to adverse tax consequences insofar as 
the creditor may be taxed for entity–level profits notwithstanding its failure to receive any distri-
butions. Id. at 32–33 (citing Rev. Rul. 77–137, 1977–1 C.B. 178); Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Mem-
ber Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging Order Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 226–27 
(same). Again, though, this concern seems exaggerated. While it is true that any potential of ad-
verse tax consequences is likely to trouble creditors, it appears that Revenue Ruling 77–137 is being 
interpreted too broadly. That Ruling (which addresses limited partnerships and limited partners) 
indicates that assignees can be held as tax partners under federal income tax law, even if they are 
not full partners, under state law. See Rev. Rul. 77–137, 1977–1 C.B. 178. However, this only occurs if 
the assignee acquires “substantially all of the dominion and control over the limited partnership.” 
Id. That does not occur in connection with a foreclosure, for all of the reasons addressed above. The 
creditor does not become a “full member,” with all the attendant rights, so the level of dominion 
and control necessary to create tax partner status simply does not exist. See Arthur B. Willis et 
al., Partnership Taxation ¶ 1.03[7] (7th ed. 2011) (citing I.R.S. Gen. Couns. Mem. 36,960 (Dec. 
20, 1976)). Nevertheless, the fear of adverse tax consequences persists and is often promulgated as a 
reason why foreclosure is not useful and so not likely to be widely utilized.
153 Indeed, it is very rare for an LLC to ever be publicly traded. The vast majority of publicly 
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relatively closely held LLCs such that there is no way to establish, much less 
receive, fair value.154
Additionally, even if there were a market for the interest, many closely 
held partnerships and LLCs are laced with contractual provisions that 
restrict the manner in which partners or members can sell or transfer their 
interests.155 These restrictions mean that even if a creditor could find a 
willing buyer, the creditor would not be able to freely transfer the interest to 
that buyer. Such restrictions chill the market and restrict liquidity, thereby 
diminishing value. As such, even after gaining ownership of a partnership 
interest, a creditor will be unlikely to sell the LLC interest at anything 
approaching fair market value.156
So foreclosure is not perfect and does not completely transfer power 
from the debtor to the creditor. But it does not need to. Many commentators 
who examined charging order foreclosure have more or less scorned the 
danger of foreclosure by pointing out the imperfections inherent therein,157
but these arguments are only partially correct. The ULLCA, which provides 
for foreclosure, also gives a significant bite to that remedy, despite the 
“bare economic” nature of a member’s transferable interest, by specifically 
providing that “[a] transferee who does not become a member is entitled to 
. . . seek . . . a judicial determination that it is equitable to dissolve and wind 
up the company’s business.”158 This right, when coupled with the power to 
traded companies are corporations, not LLCs or any other type of entity. See Robert C. Micheletto, 
Comment, The Poison Pill: A Panacea for the Hostile Corporate Takeover, 21 J. Marshall L. Rev. 107, 
119 (1987) (citing Leo Herzel & Laura D. Richman, Delaware’s Preeminence by Design—Foreword to 
R. Franklin Balotti & Jesse A. Finkelstein, Delaware Law of Corporations & Business 
Organizations, at ix (1986)).
154 See, e.g., Eyler v. Comm’r, 69 T.C.M. (CCH) 2200, 2207 (1995) (“[I]n determining the 
value of unlisted stocks, actual sales made in reasonable amounts at arm’s length, in the normal 
course of business, within a reasonable time before or after the valuation date, are the best criteria 
of market value.”).
155 See, e.g., Weise, supra note 71, at 382 (“Many partnership agreements and operating agree-
ments also contain contractual transfer restrictions. Sometimes these transfer restrictions merely 
repeat the statutory restrictions on the transfer of governance rights, but many agreements go fur-
ther. For example, a partnership or operating agreement might provide a ‘first refusal’ or other ‘buy–
sell’ mechanism or otherwise limit or even prohibit the assignment of economic rights even though 
under the relevant statutory provisions the economic rights are otherwise freely transferable.”).
156 See Bishop, Desiderata: The Single Member Limited Liability Company Olmstead Charging 
Order Statutory Lacuna, supra note 42, at 225 (focusing on “the lack of liquidity, marketability, and 
transferability” of single member LLCs). Contrast this with foreclosure of real property and tan-
gible personal property. While foreclosure in those circumstances is often costly and time–consum-
ing, those types of property are relatively easy to seize, value, and sell. If nothing else, the foreclosing 
creditor can generally bid some or all of the obligation owing to it, thereby exchanging debt for an 
asset. This is generally called a “credit bid” and results in the creditor possessing an actual, tangible 
asset that can be sold or otherwise utilized.
157 See, e.g., id.
158 See Unif. Ltd. Liab. Co. Act § 503(e)(3) (1996), 6B U.L.A. 604 (2008). Hawaii, Mon-
tana, South Carolina, Vermont, and West Virginia have adopted this provision.
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foreclose, means that recipients of a charging order can, in fact, terminate 
the business operations of an LLC.159
Moreover, even in jurisdictions that do not permit a foreclosing creditor 
to seek dissolution, the imperfect practicalities of foreclosure simply do 
not change the basic structure of the law, which transfers some right or 
ownership of the debtor to the creditor.160 Pointing out that the process 
is not ideal does not diminish the legal reality that foreclosure permits 
creditors to gain a foothold in the business entity and its operations in that 
they now have a specific ownership right to something, whatever it is. Third 
party partners must know, and account for, the fact that after a foreclosure, 
there is now a stranger to the original partnership that owns some explicit 
part of the partnership and to whom some duties or obligations are owed.
Foreclosure, then, introduces uncertainty. Again, it is this sort of 
involvement and uncertainty that entities and third party partners want to 
avoid. When the possibility of foreclosure is present, no one can count on 
an assured barrier to protect LLC assets from creditors. Instead, everyone 
must anticipate that creditors might foreclose, thrusting all parties into 
an area of ambiguity and indecision, wherein neither the debtor nor the 
creditor seems to have a full ownership interest in anything. This lack of 
certainty is a powerful element that should be explicitly recognized by those 
utilizing LLCs161 and gives creditors significant leverage, going far beyond 
the toothless remedy many describe.
Thus, there are a number of mainstream remedies contained within 
charging order statutes that permit lawyers and judges to give charging 
orders their due weight as real property and thereby shift their focus to 
maximizing the utility and scope of this unique creditor property right. 
There is, in addition, a significantly more aggressive argument available to 
holders of charging orders in the context of LLCs, wherein creditors can 
seek to push beyond the type of foreclosure typically available in the LLC 
context and therefore expand their rights to true ownership status.
Initially, it is important to note that this argument to expand foreclosure 
rights may not work in those states that have adopted exclusivity language 
159 See In re Canney, 284 F.3d 362, 369 (2d Cir. 2002); Provident Bank v. Lewitt, 852 A.2d 852, 
855–56 (Conn. App. Ct. 2004). Under Connecticut law, a court can order a strict foreclosure rather 
than a standard sale. Upon doing so, the court will normally give the debtor a set period of time in 
which to pay off or redeem the debt. If the debtor fails to do so in the allotted time, the creditor is 
granted immediate ownership and possession of the property. Provident Bank, 852 A.2d at 855–56. 
Vermont law is similar, also permitting strict foreclosure. See, e.g., In re Canney, 284 F.3d at 369.
160 For instance, it is clear that the purchaser at a foreclosure sale has inspection rights. See
Kozlow, supra note 139, at 888 (footnotes omitted) (“The rights of an assignee include reasonable 
inspections of the LLC’s books and records, a right to reasonable information or a reasonable ac-
count of the transactions of the company, as well as the right to receive distributions.”).
161 See Gregory S. Alexander, Freedom, Coercion, and the Law of Servitudes, 73 Cornell L. 
Rev. 883, 893 (1988) (discussing the “importance of legal certainty ex ante to . . . private planning”).
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in their charging order statutes.162 To the extent that there is no exclusivity 
rule that preempts the field, however, holders of charging orders should 
consider arguing that foreclosure entitles them to more than a mere 
transferable interest. As discussed above, partnership law has long protected 
the business entity and non–debtor partners by limiting the nature of a 
partnership interest that is foreclosed upon. And there is no question 
that this approach has traditionally applied to LLCs as well.163 However, 
it is conceivable that shifting the perception of the charging order to a 
property–based remedy, which should be construed broadly, will entice the 
courts to expand upon this concept, as well.
Courts could utilize the concept of a property–based remedy by 
ordering foreclosure and dictating that such process transfer full and 
complete ownership (instead of a mere transferable interest). Conceptually, 
this makes sense in the context of LLCs.164 LLCs are, in relevant ways, 
much more like corporations than like partnerships. In particular, a 
member of an LLC enjoys limited liability and is not liable for the acts 
of its co–members beyond its initial investment.165 Additionally, LLCs 
can be managed by a non–member manager, who functions like an officer 
of a corporation and controls the company on behalf of its constituent 
owners.166 These similarities to corporations are important because they 
162 See supra note 101 and accompanying text. A number of LLC charging order statutes 
explicitly provide that the rights contained therein constitute “the exclusive remedy by which a per-
son seeking to enforce a judgment against a member or transferee may, in the capacity of judgment 
creditor, satisfy the judgment from the judgment debtor’s transferable interest.” Rev. Unif. Ltd. 
Liab. Co. Act § 503(g) (2006), 6B U.L.A. 499 (2008). As discussed above, there is some question 
about the nature of this exclusivity. See Callison, supra note 40, at 343 n.22 (“Although courts have 
implied that charging orders are the exclusive remedy under the UPA, the various rationales for 
that conclusion are unclear.”); see also Kleinberger, Bishop & Geu, supra note 66, at 33. Determining 
the true impact of this language is beyond the scope of this Article, however. The remedy described 
in the remainder of this Article is likely only available in those states with statutes that do not truly 
exclude other remedies. 
163 See supra note 118–119 and accompanying text. It is clear that the transferable interest 
referred to in RULLCA section 502 comes from partnership law. See Carol R. Goforth, Why Ar-
kansas Should Adopt the Revised Uniform Limited Liability Company Act, 30 U. Ark. Little Rock 
L. Rev. 31, 68 (2007) (following “the lead of traditional partnership law in specifying that an owner’s 
transferable interest in an LLC is personal property”).
164 This wide view of charging order foreclosure may make sense in the context of limited 
partnerships, as well, though these entities combine the corporate and partnership elements at play 
in this analysis.
165 See Jonathan R. Macey, The Limited Liability Company: Lessons for Corporate Law, 73 
Wash. U. L.Q. 433, 434 (1995) (“[T]he purpose of forming a limited liability company is to create 
an entity that offers investors the protections of limited liability and the flow–through tax status 
of partnerships.”).
166 See William H. Clark, Jr., The Relationship of the Model Business Corporation Act to Other 
Entity Laws, Law & Contemp. Probs., Winter 2011, at 57, 71 (“A manager of an LLC has a posi-
tion that can combine elements of the functions of directors and officers in a corporation.”). Not 
all LLCs are run by managers, and managers are often also members. Nonetheless, it is accurate to 
Kentucky Law Journal736 [ Vol. 102
are what gave rise to the charging order in the partnership context. Recall 
from above that charging orders were created to honor the pick your 
partner principle and to ensure that partnerships, as relatively small and 
personally managed enterprises, were not disrupted by the intrusion of an 
unwanted third party.167 These concerns, however, are largely absent in the 
context of LLCs. It is true that most LLCs are relatively small entities168
and that it is unlikely that any member wants to be forced to do business 
with an unknown, third–party creditor. However, the direct need to avoid 
this—the danger to a partnership arising from every partner’s ability to create 
entity–wide liability and to routinely participate in management—simply 
is not present.
Again, return to creditor property rights in the context of corporations.169
There, as in all business settings, the entity owners (the shareholders) have 
chosen their compatriots carefully and likely do not welcome outside 
intrusion. Nevertheless, the law permits it, applying execution concepts as 
a matter of course,170 because there are no partnership–centric issues that 
precipitate against doing so. And the same should apply here, where there is 
no explicit statutory prohibition: acknowledging the property nature of the 
charging order, judges should construe it broadly and permit it to foreclose 
an entire LLC interest, analogous to corporate law.171
Moreover, this extension is not so bold. Some courts have already begun 
to move along this path in certain circumstances. Florida, in particular, 
started down this route in Olmstead v. Federal Trade Commission.172 There, the 
state supreme court held that a court of competent jurisdiction could “order 
a judgment debtor to surrender all right, title, and interest in the debtor’s 
single–member LLC to satisfy an outstanding judgment.”173 Now, it is true that 
characterize LLCs as being designed with a more professional, detached leadership style than that 
associated with partnerships.
167 See supra Part II.A.
168 See Michael McCord, LCC Changes Coming Jan. 1: Act’s Author Says New Law Has Wide 
Range of Benefits, Seacoastonline (Dec. 10, 2012, 2:00 AM), http://www.seacoastonline.com/ar-
ticles/20121210–BIZ–212100303 (stating that the average size of an LLC is three members, but that 
around half of all LLCs are single member entities).
169 See supra note 75 and accompanying text.
170 See id.
171 Courts could also chart numerous middle courses, expanding current foreclosure powers 
but stopping short of doing so uniformly in all LLC contexts. One of many potential examples 
would be to permit a foreclosing charging order holder to gain complete ownership if the charging 
order attached to a majority interest (or, perhaps a “quasi majority interest” in the case of a fam-
ily or sham entity) in the LLC. This would only expose minority interest holders to a third party 
participant, something that they were potentially exposed to, in any event, given their exposure to 
the vagaries of minority ownership. Or, perhaps, courts could only permit a foreclosing charging 
order holder to gain complete ownership if the charging order attached to a single member LLC. 
See infra note 177.
172 See Olmstead v. FTC, 44 So. 3d 76, 78 (Fla. 2010).
173 See id. at 78. The case law from Olmstead is actually derived from three related cases. In 
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the holding was limited to single member LLCs174 and that Florida legislature 
has since cemented this distinction.175 However, some of the reasoning 
underlying this conclusion applies just as forcefully to multi–member LLCs. 
Olmstead, for instance, focused on a single member’s right to transfer assets 
and the fact that an interest in an LLC is similar to “corporate stock.”176 These 
characteristics do not necessarily change just because additional members have 
ownership in the entity.177 Regardless of how many members there are, an LLC 
interest is very much like a corporate interest, and there are many circumstances 
under which the two should be treated similarly. As such, it is within a court’s 
power, and within an established conceptual framework, to broadly construe 
the foreclosure power afforded a charging order holder and so give concrete 
effect to the property nature of the charging order remedy.178
the first case, the trade commission sued operators of an alleged credit card scam, resulting in a 
federal judgment. See FTC v. Peoples Credit First, LLC, No. 8:03–CV–2353–T–TBM, 2006 WL 
1169677, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 3, 2006); see also Louis T.M. Conti, The New Olmstead Patch Legisla-
tion: A Case Study in the Art of Compromise for Florida LLC Law, Fla. B.J., Dec. 2011, at 49, 49. In 
attempting to effect the judgment ultimately granted to the FTC, the federal court went beyond 
a traditional charging order and required defendants to surrender assets held by non–party, single 
member LLCs. See Peoples Credit First, 2006 WL 1169677, at *2 & n.5. Upon appeal, the 11th Circuit 
certified to the Florida Supreme Court whether such an order was permissible under Florida law. 
See FTC v. Olmstead, 528 F.3d 1310, 1314 (11th Cir. 2008). The Florida Supreme Court responded, 
ruling that “Florida law permits a court to order a judgment debtor to surrender all right, title, and 
interest in the debtor’s single–member limited liability company to satisfy an outstanding judg-
ment.” See Olmstead, 44 So. 3d at 78 (internal quotation mark omitted). 
174 See Olmstead, 44 So. 3d at 81 (“The limitation on assignee rights in section 608.433(1) [of 
Fla. Stat. (2008)] has no application to the transfer of rights in a single–member LLC. In such an 
entity, the set of ‘all members other than the member assigning the interest’ is empty. Accordingly, 
an assignee of the membership interest of the sole member in a single–member LLC becomes 
a member—and takes the full right, title, and interest of the transferor—without the consent of 
anyone other than the transferor.”).
175 See Fla. Stat. Ann. § 608.433(5)–(7) (West Supp. 2013). Other states have similarly made 
this distinction, with some reaching the same conclusion and others, the opposite. Compare Utah 
Code. Ann. § 48–2c–1103(2)(d) (LexisNexis 2010) (“Notwithstanding Subsection (2)(c), if the 
member whose interest is charged under this section is the sole member of the company when the 
charging order was entered: (i) the purchaser at a foreclosure sale acquires all rights of the member, 
including voting rights; and (ii) the member is considered to have consented to the admission of 
the purchaser as a member of the company.”), with Wyo. Stat. Ann. § 17–29–503(g) (2011) (“This 
section provides the exclusive remedy by which a person seeking to enforce a judgment against a 
judgment debtor, including any judgment debtor who may be the sole member, dissociated member 
or transferee, may, in the capacity of the judgment creditor, satisfy the judgment from the judgment 
debtor’s transferable interest or from the assets of the limited liability company.”).
176 See Olmstead, 44 So. 3d at 80.
177 It is likely that most LLCs with multiple members would have some sort of transfer 
restriction. However, this only holds for non–controlling interests in a truly arm’s–length entity. To 
the extent that the debtor retains actual or constructive control, this element is just as applicable, 
regardless of the number of members.
178 See In re Albright, 291 B.R. 538, 541 (Bankr. D. Colo. 2003) (“A charging order protects the 
autonomy of the original members, and their ability to manage their own enterprise. In a single–
member entity, there are no non–debtor members to protect. The charging order limitation serves 
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Conclusion
This Article seeks to untangle and lay bare the true nature of charging 
orders. Long viewed as a toothless remedy, hopelessly transferring the balance 
of power from debtors to creditors, a charging order is much more than that. It 
is property, and understanding and focusing on that basic fact is important. Its 
underlying intent is to transfer ownership from a debtor to a creditor. While it 
is true that a charging order is not a wholesale transfer of rights and was, in fact, 
created in the context of partnership law as a compromise interest, that does not 
change its fundamental nature. Recognizing the charging order’s genesis within 
the greater constellation of creditor property rights and its inherent nature as 
a true and legitimate property interest means that the focus should be upon 
maximizing the value of this remedy, not minimizing it. 
And there are many ways in which this could be done. In particular, a 
renewed focus on the powers granted to courts and charging order holders 
and a more aggressive attempt to utilize foreclosure in certain circumstances 
both seem conceptually and philosophically legitimate. The result of this 
shift in perception and execution will, of course, re–shift the current balance 
of power between debtors and creditors and could permanently alter the 
manner in which partnerships, limited partnerships, and LLCs are utilized. 
Courts, practitioners, and academics should all take note, as this would 
constitute a significant and important change affecting many areas of the 
law and practice.
no purpose in a single member limited liability company, because there are no other parties’ inter-
ests affected.”). Again, there is a conceptual basis to expand this beyond mere single member LLCs, 
given that the “autonomy of the original [owners] and their ability to manage their own enterprise” 
in multi–member LLCs is no less exposed than in corporations. But see id. at 541 n.9 (“The harder 
question would involve an LLC where one member effectively controls and dominates the mem-
bership and management of an LLC that also involves a passive member with a minimal interest. 
If the dominant member files bankruptcy, would a trustee obtain the right to govern the LLC? 
Pursuant to Colo. Rev. Stat. § 7–80–702, if the non–debtor member did not consent, even if she 
held only an infinitesimal interest, the answer would be no. The Trustee would only be entitled to 
a share of distributions, and would have no role in the voting or governance of the company.”).
